大股东控制影响上市公司投资效率的路径研究

The Mechanism Study of Major Stockholder's Influence on Investment Efficiency of Listed Firms

本文在使用随机前沿分析(SFA)测度中国上市公司投资效率的基础上,将股权结构、公司治理机制?投融资行为与投资效率纳入一个统一的框架体系,运用通径分析方法,就大股东控制对投资效率影响的作用机制及其效应进行实证分析,以鉴定中国资本市场的资源配置效率。结果表明:大股东控制对投资效率具有"激励效应"和"损耗效应"的两面性,并且其"损耗效应"大于"激励效应",大股东控制通过独立董事比例和资本结构对投资效率发生的"损耗效应"是中国资本市场资源配置无效率的根本原因。因此,只有完善其他能有效制约大股东"损耗效应"的公司治理机制,才能有效地优化上市公司的投资行为,促进中国资本市场资源配置效率的提高。

By assessing investment efficiency based on SFA model and path analysis method, this paper mainly studies major stockholder controlling and corporate governance mechanism, especially their interactive effect on efficiency of investment. The empirical result shows that major stockholder controlling not only has a positive impact on efficiency of investment, but also has a negative impact on efficiency of investment. Overall efficiency of China＇s stock market is no efficient. The main reason is that the major stockholder controlling has a negative impact on efficiency of investment through ratio of independent directors and capital structure. So it is suggested that all corporate governance mechanisms must be perfected.