弹性需求条件下价格折扣的博弈

Game Analysis of Price Discounts Under Elastic Demand

文章研究了在商品富有弹性需求条件下,供应商和零售商对有无价格折扣如何做出最优决策的问题。基于Stackelberg博弈建立了数学模型,分析了供应商给零售商的价格折扣以及零售商给消费者的价格折扣是如何改善供应商和零售商双方的利润以及双方是如何确定最优价格折扣点的,文章最后还利用MATLAB仿真软件给出了数值分析。研究结果表明,提供价格折扣不但能改善供应商和零售商双方的利润,还能改善消费者的处境,即提高社会效率。

This paper studies how a supplier and a retailer make the optimal decision for the commodities with elastic demand without price discount. Based on Stackbelberg game, we build a mathematical model to research how the price discounts supplier supply to the retail and the retail supply to consumers improve the profits of both and how them determine the optimal discounts. At last, a numerical analysis was given. It was shown that when the supplier and retail determine price discount, not only their profits increase, but also improve the situation of consumers, that enhance the social effecieney.