摘要
本文运用以ESS为核心的进化博弈论分析方法对我国信托业监管体制下监管机构(中国银监会)和被监管者(信托公司)的策略选择进行分析,研究较长时间内信托公司对是否诚信的选择比例变动趋势和进化稳定性,并寻求"不诚信"行为产生的内在根源、作用机制和关键因素,从而对我国信托业监管体制演进的变化趋势提出改进意见。
The article use the evolutionary game theory analysis with ESS as the core to conduct analysis of the strategic choices made by regulatory authority （China Banking Regulatory Commission） and the supervised （trust company） under China trust industry regulatory system; Investigate that such longer period the proportion variation trend of the choice of whether to be honest made by trust companies and the evolutionary stability; Also seek the intrinsic causes, action mechanism and key factors of the ＂dishonesty＂ behavior in order to suggest improvements for the evolvement trend of China trust industry regulatory system.
出处
《上海管理科学》
CSSCI
2010年第4期25-30,共6页
Shanghai Management Science
关键词
信托公司
进化博弈论
监管体制
Trust company
Evolutionary game theo- ry
Regulatory system
