国有控股企业公司治理和风险管理的链接与互动

The Correlations and Interactions between Corporate Governance and Venture-management in State-owned Enterprises

通过对国有控股企业公司治理结构和风险管理链结与互动的思考,认为国有控股企业建立有效的公司治理机制和风险管理制度必须二者并重。要在国有控股企业建立有效的公司治理机制,必须改变国有股东一股独大的局面,改变"一把手"集权制,由所有者决策、参与并在所有者监督下,塑造出国有企业公司负责任的主体。同时为改变国企上市公司董事会治理中出现的"弱独立性-强控股股东控制性"的状况,应强化独立董事的监督职能,为避免监督机制上的功能冲突,可考虑取消监事会制度。基于公司治理结构的风险管理制度,则应建立内部动态风险预警体系和约束规范机制,建立企业风险基金,把授权授信作为企业风险监控的重点,使企业的整体风险防范能力在规范的公司治理结构框架下得到增强。

This article presents a speculation on the correlations and interactions between corporate governance and venture-management in a state-owned enterprise.The article argues that it is equally important for a state-owned enterprise to set up effective corporate governance and strong venture-management.Effective corporate governance requires the enterprise to：1.reduce the power centralized to the state-owned shareholder;2.let owners participate in decision-making,attend to the business of the enterprise,and supervise the shaping of the body of state-owned enterprise with the body＇s main duties taken by the company.To change the current phenomenon of listed companies,namely,weak independence of the board of directors vis-à-vis strong control by controlling shareholder,the independent director＇s function of supervision shall be strengthened.Board of supervisors can be abolished,in a consideration of avoiding conflicts over the duty of supervision.As for venture-management grounded upon corporate governance,there shall be a well-regulated mechanism and a risk alert system to watch over the interior dynamics of the company.The enterprise should insure its VC funds and lay the stress of risk-supervision on conferring duties and credits.The faculty to defend risks can be thus enhanced in the frame of well-regulated corporate governance.