摘要
我国上市公司债务治理效应整体偏弱,公司业绩与债务水平显著负相关,但由于直接财务效应影响的差异性,以及债务期限结构、公司控制人性质、股权集中度和流通股比重等因素的作用,使债务水平具有较好的托宾Q效应,从而出现"效率悖论"现象。改善债务期限结构,增强金融机构对外信贷的预算约束和监控力度,加强国有投资主体对控股公司的约束力,强化股权制衡关系,加强证券市场建设,是解决这一问题的主要途径。
It should be pointed out that the debt governance effect in listed companies is weak, and company performance is negatively correlated with debt level. Owing to the difference of the direct financial effect, debt maturity structure, company controllers' character, equity concentration and the proportion of tradable equity, there is a conspicuous Tobin-Q effect on debt level. Furthermore, there comes a phenomenon of "paradox on efficiency". In order to solve this problem, we should improve debt maturity structure, increase the budget constraint and monitoring intensity of financial institutions' external credit, strengthen the constraint of state-owned investment entities to companies, intensify the relationship of ownership restriction, and deepen the reform in stock right decentralized allot revolution.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第9期114-119,共6页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
关键词
股权结构
债务治理
直接财务效应
效率悖论
ownership structure
debt governance
direct financial effect
paradox on efficiency