国有控股、治理特征与公司投资

State Ownership,Governance Characteristics and the Over-Investment of Free Cash Flow

本文在代理理论框架下,基于中国转型经济时期的制度背景,实证考察了国有控股对自由现金流的过度投资的影响以及它的制度根源。研究发现,国有控股上市公司存在明显的自由现金流代理问题,公司过度投资规模与内部自由现金流量呈显著的正相关关系。进一步的研究表明,政府干预、薪酬管制和债务软约束这三大治理弱化是导致国有公司出现过度投资并降低投资效率的制度根源。本研究对资本市场的监管设计具有重要启示:单纯强调产权改革和外部治理机制的完善,对于提高国有公司的投资效率只能起到"隔靴搔痒"的效果。要想根本上提高国有公司的投资效率,监管层惟有从解决"内部治理弱化"的根源入手,通过弱化政府干预动机、薪酬改革以及深化银行体制改革等制度变革,从治理层面真正规范国有公司自身的投资行为。

This paper investigates the effects of state ownership and control on over-investment of free cash flow and their institutional underpinning. The authors find that state-owned listed corporation has more serious the problem of over-investment in free cash flow. Government intervention, compensation regulation and soft debt constraint are the main reasons. This research results provide important policy implications. Over-investment of free cash flow in state-owned companies arises from weak corporate governance. Therefore, investment efficiency could not be improved by strengthening outside governance, but by implementing inside governance reform, such as curtailing government intervention, reforming compensation incentive and bank system.