摘要
通过应用不完全信息的贝叶斯博弈理论,为服务匹配双方建立了一个双向拍卖的博弈模型。该模型基于双方各自的QoS期望值进行竞拍,用双方都能取得最大收益的均衡QoS值达成交易,以确保各自的QoS需求和服务匹配成功。相关的讨论和分析表明该模型方法是有效的。
A two-way auction game model was established for the two sides of service matching via the incomplete-information Bayesian game theory.Both sides can adopt the model to conduct auction based on their quality of service(QoS) expectations and to complete a deal by achieving balanced QoS(equilibrium value) with the maximum benefit.The model can satisfy both sides’requirement of QoS and ensure the success of service matching.Related discussions and analysis show that the model is effective.
出处
《福建工程学院学报》
CAS
2010年第4期396-399,共4页
Journal of Fujian University of Technology
基金
福建工程学院科研发展预研基金(GY-Z0878)
福建工程学院科研启动项目(GY-Z09009)
关键词
网络计算
服务匹配
QOS
贝叶斯均衡
network computing
service matching
quality of service(QoS)
Bayesian equilibrium