探究我国上市公司股利政策的实证研究——基于代理成本理论

Empirical Research on Dividend Policy of China's Listed Company——On the basis of the agency theory

采用多元回归的方法研究派现与上市公司三种不同代理成本之间的关系。实证发现,派现能降低股东与管理者的代理成本,正常现金股利发放只是大股东获取公共收益的一种手段,不能缓解大小股东之间的利益冲突,降低大股东的私有收益。

This paper investigates the relationship between cash dividend and three different agency problems by multiple regression. We find cash dividend can debase the agency cost between shareholders and manager. Well-balanced cash dividend policy is just approach to gain public income by larger shareholder, but not to reduce the private benefit of larger shareholder, well-balanced cash dividend policy also doesn＇t mitigate the conflict in two kinds of shareholders.