乡村巨变中的信贷合约风险及其控制--基于濮阳模式的制度分析

The Credit Agreement Risk and Its Control in the Great Change Countryside——A Case analysis of the PuYang Mode

三十年来的乡村巨变引发了农村信贷市场的系统风险。这使得,一方面,越来越多的农民在金融合作上由于乡村社会权威结构的解体和收入来源的多样化而陷入困境;另一方面,已经存在于农村金融市场上的信贷机构又面临着不断加剧的系统风险,这样,金融机构就不得不采取市场化利率、小额信贷、小组联保、分期付款、中心主任等或类似形式的制度创新来规避这一系统风险。濮阳模式是这一制度创新的典型,其以独特的信贷风险防控机制和组织框构,化解了农村金融市场上日益严重的信息不对称难题,并能在某种程度上在权威结构日益解体的乡村社会中对小农进行组织化,以使助贷社能够借助国家权力与乡村社会的权威力量来保障信贷合约的强制执行。应该看到,乡村巨变引发的系统风险要求国家对农村金融市场强化监管,并且要求政府介入以解决小农金融合作困境。

The systemic risk in the rural credit market is producted by the countryside great change.So,more and more peasants get into hot water because of the disorganization in the countryside authority frame and the diversification in the peasants include,and the organizations in the rural market are in face of bad risk,In order to keep away this systemic risk,,market-oriented interest rate,microfinance,group lending,amortisation and so on institutions are adopted.by these organizations.The goverment should adopt more strit supervision to the rural credit market,and should get involved in the peasant financal cooperation.