摘要
针对同时行动与递次行动两种不同的时序结构,建立单边溢出与双边溢出两个多阶段研发博弈模型,得出了企业研发投入反应函数,探讨了子博弈精炼纳什均衡结果,并对溢出水平对战略研发投入的影响规律进行了对比分析,为企业研发决策及科技政策的制定提供了有益启示。
Aiming at two different kinds of timing structure of simultaneous and sequential action, two multi-stage games model under unidirectional spillovers and bidirectional spillovers are constructed. Further, reaction ftmctions are derived and subgame-perfect Nash equilibriums are discussed. Law of influence of spillovers level on strategic R＆D investments are compared with each other, which throws light on R＆D investments decision of enterprises and R＆D policies enacting of government.
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第17期99-102,共4页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金
江苏省软科学项目(BR2008041)
关键词
单边溢出
双边溢出
研发投入
产量竞争
Unidirectional Spillover
Bidirectional Spillover
R＆D Investment
Quantity Competition
