摘要
从经济学的角度对虚假广告相关问题进行分析,认为由于广告信息的不对称和出于自身利益的激励,必然导致虚假广告和相关利益集团的产生;在对虚假广告的治理中,与补贴相比,加大惩罚显然是一个更好的方式。
This article analyzes related issues about false advertising from the perspective of economics and gets that: asymmetries of the advertising information and incentive for self-interest will inevitably lead to the advent of false advertising and related interest groups.But in the governance of the false advertising, compared with the subsidies, increasing punishment is clearly a better way.
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第9期146-151,共6页
Commercial Research
关键词
虚假广告
委托-代理
博弈
经济学分析
false advertising
principal-agent theory
game theory
economics analysis