不确定性风险、治理冲突与审计师选择——来自1998—2004年中国A股IPO市场的经验证据

Ex ante Uncertainty Risk,Governance Conflicts,and Auditor Choice:Empirical Evidence from China's IPO Market,1998—2004

审计需求偏好及其演进趋势是理解我国经济转型过程中独立审计经济角色,进而评价独立审计制度绩效的重要研究议题。基于我国新股发行市场化改革背景,首次从信息需求和监督需求双重视角进行的实证研究发现,一方面,随着新股发行市场化进程加快,新兴的高质量审计需求开始出现,核准制实施后不确定性风险越低的IPO公司更为偏好高质量审计师。另一方面,尽管一定程度上股东与经理人间的治理冲突与高质量审计需求正相关,但有效市场约束机制的匮乏导致现阶段我国大股东与中小股东间的治理冲突难以引发有效审计需求,而国有控股股东的"所有者缺位"问题则进一步削弱了该需求。上述研究结果表明,当前进一步改善我国资本市场有效审计需求不足问题首先需要解决大股东的有效治理问题。

To understand the economic role played by independent auditing in China＇s transition economy and evaluate the performance of independent auditing system,it is important to investigate the demand for audit services as well as the evolution of the system. Based on the marketization reform of Initial Public Offering （IPO） in China,this paper examines the issue empirically from both the information demand and the monitoring demand perspectives. We find that,on the one hand,the demand for high-quality auditing increases with the progress of IPO marketization reform. IPO firms with lower uncertainty risk are more likely to select high-quality auditors after the implementation of authorization system. On the other hand,although the governance conflicts between managers and shareholders create the demand for high-quality auditing,the inadequacy of effective market constraint mechanisms results in governance conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders and reduces the demand for high-quality auditing. The ″absentee owner″ problem for the state controlling shareholders further weakens such a demand. Our findings suggest that the demand for high-quality auditing in China＇s capital market is not likely to increase unless the governance problem associated with controlling shareholders is addressed.