摘要
从康德到黑格尔,主体发生了很大的变化:主体由道德的主体变为伦理的主体,由"善良意志"的先验主体变为伦理实体下相互承认的互主体。这种主体的嬗变,不是一般意义上的演变,而是对康德所代表的传统主体概念的一种变革、一种超越、甚至是一种颠覆。黑格尔主体的颠覆具有深远的意义,既是主体向互主体的过渡,也是道德向伦理的过渡,为道德哲学的研究提供了一条伦理的致思方式。
From Kant to Hegel, subject has changed from the moral subject to the ethical subject and from the transcendental subject of good will to mutual subject in ethics entity. This evolution of subject is not a change in the general sense, but rather the reform, the transcendence and even the subversion of Kant's traditional concept of subject. The subversion of Hegel's subject is of profound significance: it is not only the transition from subject to mutual subject, but also from morality to ethics, which offers the ethical thinking for research on moral philosophy.
出处
《内蒙古师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
2010年第4期97-101,共5页
Journal of Inner Mongolia Normal University:Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition
关键词
主体
道德
互主体
伦理
subject
morality
mutual subject
ethics