服务设施选址的博弈分析

Location Games for Service Facilities

市场除具有网络特征外,还具有明显的层次嵌套特征。文章结合这两个方面的特征,对具有层次嵌套特征的人口、市场空间分布条件下服务设施的选址博弈问题进行了研究。结果发现,两个企业的服务设施竞争选址静态博弈,可以不存在纳什均衡;在纳什均衡存在的情况下,并不能保证双方市场份额相等;市场层次嵌套特征在一定程度上破坏均衡的存在,内层市场较大的市场份额吸引着对手进入,使外层市场均衡受到破坏;增加服务设施可以扩大市场覆盖范围,但由于利润最大化目标和距离的约束,在给定市场环境下,有些市场区域可能永远无法覆盖。

A study about the competitive location by Hotelling in 1929 was on a linear market. Other studies on this subject are on plane, circle, or network markets. This paper addresses the subject on a general market with nested hierarchies. For static models with two firms, it is shown that there is no Nash equilibrium sometimes; even if the equilibria existing, the market shares for two firms may not be equal; the nested hierarchies of markets, to an extent, lead to the non-existence of Nash equilibria because the more shares within inner markets, which motivate the other players in the games to enter, make unstable outer markets; increasing the number of facilities may extend the coverage of marketing areas, but there are some areas which may not be covered under a given marketing environment due to the objectives of profit maximization and the distance constraints on consumers.