摘要
本文是对Cellini和Lambertini(2009)的模型应用于不同区域企业竞争的拓展。从企业R&D合作的视角阐述了地区政府在怎样的环境下选择区域合作。通过比较独自研发和结成R&Dcartel两种情况的稳态,表明企业选择R&D合作与否由其本质属性决定的,当技术外溢为正时,企业选择合作,当技术外溢为负时,企业选择独自研发。在地区政府方面,地区政府进行区域合作与否跟其辖下的企业的本质属性没有必然的关系。只要其足够重视消费者,只要市场容量足够大,其将采取措施降低贸易障碍,进行区域合作。
This paper is an extension of Cellini and Lambertini (2009) model and we extend it to analyze competitions of enterprises in different areas. And then we elaborated the regional govemment chooses regional cooperation under what kind of environment in the perspective of enterprise R&D cooperation. By comparing two steady--states of R & D alone and form R & D cartel, we find that whether enterprises choose R&D cooperation or not determined by their essential nature. When the technological spillover is positive, enterprises choose cooperation, when the spillover is negative, enterprises choose R & D alone. From regional governments, they cooperate or not is not necessarily related with the nature of the enterprises under their property .As long as they pay sufficient attention to consumers, and as long as the market size is large enough, they will take measures to reduce trade barriers to regional cooperation.
出处
《南开经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第3期35-48,共14页
Nankai Economic Studies
关键词
R&D合作
区域合作
技术外溢
开环纳什均衡
R & D Cooperation
Regional Cooperation
Technology Spillover
Open- loop Nash Equilibrium