直接干预市场与限制竞争:中国产业政策的取向与根本缺陷

Direct Market Intervention and Restrict Competition: The Orientation of China’s Industrial Policy and Its Fundamental Defects

21世纪以来,中国的产业政策以促进产业结构调整升级与抑制部分产业产能过剩为目标;从政策的实施手段上来看,目录指导、市场准入、项目审批与核准、供地审批、贷款的行政核准、强制性清理(淘汰落后产能)等行政性直接干预措施进一步被强化;中国的产业政策是典型意义的选择性产业政策,对微观经济的干预更为广泛、细致和直接,从而体现出强烈的直接干预市场、以政府选择代替市场机制和限制竞争的管制性特征和浓厚的计划经济色彩。这种中国特色的产业政策难以找到相对应的理论依据,勉强找到的理论依据也是不充分的或者理论依据本身就存在严重的问题,或者干脆就是对理论本身的误读和扭曲。静态且过于简单地理解市场机制,是中国特色产业政策存在根本缺陷的一个最为重要的原因,它导致政策部门在制定和实施产业政策中行为边界和行为方式上的错乱。因而,重新认识市场机制对于反思中国产业政策具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。

From the beginning of 21th century,the government of China has been implementing selective industrial policies in pursuit of promoting industrial restructuring and restraining excess productive capacity in parts of industries.Looking from implementation methods,the administrative interference has been reinforced further,such as guidance catalogue,market entry access,project approval,approval for land use,loan application administrative examination and approval,closing down backward production facilities forcibly and so on.Correspondingly,China’s industrial policy is typically selective industrial policy,characterized by intervening in the market directly,competition restriction,replacing the market mechanism with government intervention and selection.The present theoretical basis can hardly explain this kind of Chinese characteristics industry policy,if any,the theoretical basis is not sufficient enough or there exist serious problems of the theoretical basis itself,or simply a misunderstanding and distortion to the theoretical basis.The theoretical basis of China’s industrial policy has fundamental deficiency due to understanding the market mechanism statically and simply,which leads to the policy-making departments confused on behavior boundary and behavioral pattern.Therefore,re-understanding the market mechanism’s foundational function has great theoretical and practical value to survey China’s industrial policy.