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企业权力来源及其分配模式 被引量:1

Source of Power of A Business and Its Distribution Model
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摘要 在过去的200年里,很少有经济学家关注企业内部结构和功能。到了20世纪80年代,虽然企业黑箱被打开,但经济学家的研究重心主要放在激励问题上,而企业中权力问题并没有得到主流经济学家的深入研究。究其原因,相当部分是因为在完全合约里权力与行动是无关的。随着合约不完全的特性被认识,企业中的权力问题也逐渐进入经济学家的研究视野。 In the past 200 years,an business has been a black box in the economic model,and few economists have concerned about its internal structure and function.Until 1980s,this black box was opened,but the economists put the emphasis on the motivation issue.The mainstream economists didn't make a deep study of power problem in a business because power and action is irrelevant in the contract to a great extent.Now that the characteristics of incomplete contract are known to all,the economists begin to study the power problem in a business.
出处 《税务与经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第5期7-12,共6页 Taxation and Economy
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究项目资助(项目编号:085C790069)
关键词 企业权力 分配模式 合约 a business power distribution model contract
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参考文献22

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