胡塞尔对科学的批判与实践维度的开启

Husserl's Criticism of Science and Opening up of Practice Dimension

胡塞尔对科学的理念化模式的批判是希望哲学回到曾被科学所遗忘的主体性中,他的现象学就是一种主体性哲学。这样,他的现象学本质地蕴涵着一种实践维度的开启。但基于现象学的意识的境域性的立场,这种实践维度有其难以克服的困境。依据儒家哲学的义理,可以探讨与解决这一困境。

Husserl＇s criticism of the scientific conceptualization pattern is aimed at expecting philosophy to return to subjectivity which is forgotten by science. His phenomenology is a subjectivity philosophy. In this way, his essence of phenomenology implies opening up of practice dimension. However, based on the position of consciousness limitation of phenomenology, the practice dimension has its dilemma that is hard to get over. The paper explores the solution to the problem according to argumentation of Confucianism philosophy.