黑白芝麻理论与中国银行业反洗钱激励机制的构建

On the Necessity of Constructing Incentive Mechanism for Anti-Money Laundering in China's Banking Industry

通过一个符合现实的模型推导,本文证明了激励机制对于反洗钱的重要意义,尤其是在当前我国约束机制尚不完善的环境下,更应该侧重激励机制的建立与运用。中央银行给予商业银行一定的成本补偿和利益激励,至少对于反洗钱效果是一个"帕累托改进"。本文得出了三个命题。命题1:商业银行配合中央银行反洗钱的最优水平,与其直接或间接参与洗钱而得到的收益呈反向关系;与其识别"黑钱"的难易程度、与其直接或间接参与洗钱而受到的处罚力度以及与中央银行对其反洗钱给予的激励分成呈正向关系。命题2:为实现更好的反洗钱效果,中央银行对商业银行的反洗钱制度安排宜采取惩罚与激励并举的搭配策略。命题3:当反洗钱的难度不断提高时,中央银行宜采用"侧重并加大激励"的措施。基于此,本文提出了"从一缸、一坛到一碗的黑白芝麻理论",并为中国未来反洗钱工作提出相应政策性建议。

Through model deduction, the article laundering, especially in countries like China, where proves the significance of incentive mechanism to anti-money the constraint mechanism is still imperfect. Central banks give commercial banks certain amount of cost compensation and beneficial incentive, thus leading to Pareto improvement on the effect of anti-money laundering. The article reaches three conclusions. First, the optimal level of the tion of commercial bank with central bank is inversely proportional to the benefit that commercial bank cooperareceives through participation in money laundering directly and indirectly, and is proportional to the difficulty in identifying illegal money, the punishment for participation in money-laundering, and the incentive from central bank for antimoney laundering. Second, to achieve better anti-money laundering effect, central bank should take both punishment and incentive into the system arrangement of anti-money laundering. Third, when anti-money laundering gets more difficult, central bank should highlight and increase the incentive. Based on the above conclusions, the article imposes the theory of ＂from a jar, a jug to a bowl of black and white sesame＂, and brings out policy suggestions for the anti-money laundering in the future.