摘要
本文以2003年～2007年的上市公司为样本,研究了终极控制权、负债融资与公司投资行为之间的关系。研究结果表明:①我国上市公司的负债融资能够抑制过度投资行为,负债融资的相机治理作用强于负债融资的代理成本效应;②虽然国有上市公司和非国有上市公司负债融资都能够抑制过度投资行为,但非国有上市公司负债融资减少股东—债权人冲突及负债融资相机治理作用在整体上要优于国有上市公司。
This paper selected the listed companies to study the relationship between ultimate control rights,debt financing and investment behaviors for the period of 2003-2007.The study shows that debt financing has a discipline role for overinvestment behavior in Chinese listed companies on one hand,the non-state owned listed companies which use debt financing to reduce shareholder-creditor confliction are superior to the state owned listed companies on other hand although the debt financing of state owned and non-state owned listed companies have shown positive effects.
出处
《北京市经济管理干部学院学报》
2010年第3期33-38,共6页
Journal of Beijing Economic Management Institute
关键词
终极控制权
负债融资
公司投资行为
ultimate control rights
debt financing
investment behavior
