会计准则制定过程中的政治经济学研究:以美国和欧盟为例

Research on Political Economy of Accounting Standard Setting:Taking EU & America as Example

本文从博弈论角度,对会计准则制定过程中的政治过程进行了分析,用以确定公司在什么情景下有动机进行政治游说,而不是参与正常的会计准则制定程序;博弈论模型分析建议政治游说在欧盟比美国更易发生。研究发现:如果准则制定者希望在美国与欧盟的会计准则之间取得调和与趋同,欧洲的公司比美国更具有游说动机与影响力,因为欧洲公司拥有更多的持反对意见或否决权的参与者。

In recent years accounting researchers have identified 'political'lobbying as a problem for accounting standard setting.This paper presents a simple game-theoretic analysis of the political process to identify situations where companies have incentives to lobby the political principal instead of participating in the usual due process of accounting standard setting.Analysis of the model suggests that ''political''lobbying is more likely to happen in the EU than in the US.Furthermore it is suggested that if the relevant standard setters wish to achieve harmonization of accounting standards between the EU and the US,European companies have more lobbying leverage than their American counterparts because there are more European veto players than American ones.