摘要
目的论与义务论的区分几乎已为当今实践哲学普遍认可,但义务论现在、且从一开始就一直从属于功利主义。边沁曾建构"义务论"来意指一种功利主义世界观中的私人道德之艺术与科学。这个经典区分由布洛德(C.D.Broad)构造出来以改进西季维克(H.Sidgwick)的功利主义,随后为弗兰克纳(W.K.Frankena)所采纳。对布洛德而言,这种区分意指伦理学的两种对立趋向,然而,在弗兰克纳的教科书中,它变成一种专有区分:义务论意指不计后果,并因而几乎不可能把义务论看作一种全面的伦理学理论框架。然而,这种观念为罗尔斯(J.Rawls)所采纳,并且在他对义务论的契约式阐释中,它实际上已不再归于伦理学领域。
The distinction between teleology and deontology is today almost universally accepted within practical philosophy, but deontology is and has from the beginning been subordinate to utilitarianism. ‘Deontology’ was constructed by Bentham to signify the art and science of private morality within a utilitarian worldview. The classical distinction was constructed by Broad as a refinement of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism, and then adopted by Frankena. To Broad it signified two opposite tendencies in ethics, in Frankena’s textbooks, however, it becomes an exclusive distinction, where deontology signifies disregard for consequences, and it is therefore almost impossible to think of deontology as a framework for a comprehensive ethical theory. This conception, however, is adopted by Rawls, and in his contractarian interpretation of deontology, it is actually no more within the sphere of ethics.
出处
《哲学分析》
2010年第2期8-25,共18页
Philosophical Analysis
关键词
义务论
边沁
布洛德
弗兰克纳
罗尔斯
理性
deontology
Jeremy Bentham
C. D. Broad
William K. Frankena
John Rawls
rationality