摘要
由于家族股东的"一股独大"以及家族对企业的控制,与非家族企业相比,家族企业内部的委托——代理问题及其治理模式也有别于非家族企业。本文基于家族上市公司中特殊的"双重委托代理"问题,从我国2003~2007年沪深两市110家家族控制的上市公司中分别选取了32家作为样本,从外部治理角度,对我国家族上市公司的信息透明度与企业价值的关系进行了实证研究。实证结果发现:信息披露评价、当年的分析师预测人数与企业价值负相关,当年的分析师盈利预测偏差与企业价值之间负相关,但不显著。说明,现阶段我国上市家族公司提高信息透明度并没有发挥提升企业价值的作用。这一结论的政策意义在于:应进一步健全家族上市公司的信息披露制度,建立结构合理、实质重于形式的信息披露制度。
Because the new problem"one share big alone"and family-control in family business,the principal-agent relationship and governance pattern are different between family and non-family business.Based on the"dual-agency problem" of family business,this paper selects 32 companies from 110 family-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 2003—2007 as the samples,and studies the relationship between the information transparency and firm value from external governance aspect.The result of demonstrate study shows that: there exist negative correlation between firm value and the information disclosure evaluation,analysts follow of current year and forecast error.But forecast error is not significant.This result indicates that the higher the information transparency of Chinese family-owned listed companies,the lower firm value would be.This paper try to give some proposals: establishing an information disclosure institution with reasonable structure and more essential than formal,in order to promote the development of our family-owned listed company incessantly and healthily.
出处
《产业经济研究》
CSSCI
2010年第5期58-70,共13页
Industrial Economics Research
关键词
信息透明度
企业价值
家族企业
上市公司
信息披露
information transparency
firm value
family business
listed company
information disclosure