论劳斯的“实践诠释学”科学观

Rouse's Perspective of Science in His Theory of "Hermeneutics of Practice"

劳斯是20世纪末西方兴起的"科学诠释学的现象学"的代表人物之一。他的"实践诠释学"科学观的产生,在哲学上,其原因可概括为对"理论优位"科学观的否定、将海德格尔和福柯哲学作为理解科学的哲学本体论,以及融合英美科学哲学与欧洲大陆哲学的努力等几个方面。劳斯"实践诠释学"科学观的特征是:实践对理论具有本体论上的先在性,科学具有权力,科学是地方性知识。劳斯在科学观上的创新,最突出地表现在:提出了理解科学的实践原则,批判和发展了海德格尔的现象学科学观,拓展了科学哲学的研究领域。

Rouse is one of the representatives of Hermeneutic Phenomenology that emerged toward the end of the 20th century. The main philosophical bases for Rouse＇s perspective of science expounded in his theory of hermeneutics of practice lie in his negation of the perspective of ＂theory-domination＂, his belief that Heidegger＇s philosophy and Foucauh＇s philosophy are the philosophical ontology in understanding science, and his combination of Anglo-American philosophy of science and Continental European philosophy. The characteristics of Rouse＇s perspective of science in his theory of hermeneuties of practice include ： practice taking ontological precedence to theory, science exerting power and science being a localized knowledge. Rouse＇s original points concerning the understanding of science include： his proposal of the principle of practice for understanding science, his criticism and development of Heidegger＇s phenomenological viewpoint of science, and his expansion of realm for the philosophical research of science.