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两权分离度、剩余控制权、剩余索取权与公司绩效——基于两类国有上市公司的实证研究 被引量:10

Rights Separation Coefficient,Residual Control Rights,Residual Claim and Corporate Performance:Empirical Research on Two Types State-owned Listed Companies
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摘要 文章将公司治理中的剩余控制权与剩余索取权配置纳入终极控制人超额控制的分析框架,以沪深两市A股市场的170家国有上市公司2007年截面数据为研究样本,分析了现金流权与控制权偏离度对国有上市公司绩效的影响,并对终极控股股东超额控制与非超额控制下,剩余控制权、剩余索取权配置结构与传统企业和高新技术企业绩效间的关系进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,当终极控股股东存在超额控制时,总经理兼任董事长或副董事长与企业绩效正相关,经理层持股比例、高层管理者平均年薪与企业绩效正相关;不存在超额控制时,执行董事比例、总经理兼任董事长或副董事长对企业绩效具有负向影响,管理层持股比例对企业绩效具有正向影响;研究结果还显示,两权分离度对高新技术企业绩效具有负向影响、对传统企业绩效具有正向影响,同时,控股股东类型在两类企业绩效回归模型中的回归系数均为负,特别是在高新技术企业绩效回归模型中尤为显著,本文研究结论在一定程度上支持了国有上市公司的股权分置政策。 This paper integrates the residual rights of control and claim of corporate governance into the excess control analytical framework of the ultimate controller,based on the data of 170 state-owned listed companies in Shanghai Shenzhen stock exchange markets,and examines the relationship between residual control rights,residual claim and corporate performances of new high-tech and traditional companies under excess control and non-excess control.The result of study shows that,when there are excess control of ultimate owners in state-owned listed companies,the general manager acting concurrently as chairman or vice chairman of the board and corporate performance are positively relevant,and the ratio of equity held by the managers,average annual salary of senior managers and performances of corporation are positively relevant;when there aren't excess control of ultimate owners,the ratio of executive director in board,general manager acting concurrently as chairman or vice chairman of the board and corporate performances are negatively relevant,and the ratio of equity held by the managers and corporate performance are positively relevant.The result of study also shows that the rights separation coefficient has a negative effect on new high-tech companies'performance and a positive effect on traditional corporate performance,and that the regression coefficient of the types of ultimate controller are negative,particular to new high-tech companies.The conclusions of this study support the policy of split share structure in certain extent.
出处 《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第9期24-35,共12页 Management Review
基金 陕西省软科学基金重点课题(2008KR03 2009KRZ02) 陕西省高等学校重点学科建设计划资助
关键词 超额控制 剩余控制权 剩余索取权 公司绩效 excess control residual control rights residual claim corporate performance
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参考文献53

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