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公司控制权转移目标管理层行为的影响因素研究 被引量:3

A Study of Influence Factors on Target Managers' Behavior in Transfer of Corporate Control
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摘要 本文以1998-2004年间股权转让终止的公司为样本,以当年控制权转移成功的公司为配对样本,采用均值比较和Logistic回归的方法,研究股权转让终止公司的特征及管理者激励对管理层行为的影响。结果表明,股权协议转让终止的公司和控制权转移成功的公司相比,具有较低的管理层持股和较强的控制权激励。Logistic回归结果显示,控制权激励越大管理层抵抗的可能性就越大。建议增加管理层持股,尽快建立管理层控制权收益损失补偿机制,减少管理层对收购的抵抗。 This paper examines the listed companies of negotiated transaction discontinued during the 2000-2004 period and compares them to a matched sample of transfer of control,using paired sample mean comparison and logistic regression study the characteristics of target corporate and the influence factors of managers behavior.The result shows that companies of negotiated transaction discontinued have stronger control incentives,better management performance,more serious insider control,higher concentration equity,larger size and lower debt.Logistic regression shows that stronger control incentives,more serious insider control and higher concentration equity increase the probability of management resistance,and superior management performance and higher debt decrease the probability of management resistance.It is advised that listed companies should increase the managerial ownership and build up payment mechanism in order to decrease the management resistance.
作者 屠巧平
出处 《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第9期36-43,共8页 Management Review
基金 河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2009BJJ004) 省部共建河南大学科研项目资助(SBGJ09210)
关键词 控制权转移 管理者抵抗 LOGISTIC回归 transfer of control management resistance logistic regression
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