实际活动盈余管理的经济后果研究:来自销售操控的证据

Research on Economic Consequences of Real Earnings Management:Experimental Evidence from Sale Manipulation

实际活动盈余管理的经济后果问题尚未引起学者们的重视。本文以实际活动盈余管理中的销售操控为研究视角,以我国A股市场的上市公司为研究对象,对比分析销售操控嫌疑样本公司和配对样本公司未来三期的股东获利能力和公司投资水平,发现销售操控嫌疑样本公司随后三期的股东获利能力和公司投资水平普遍低于配对样本公司的对应水平,得出了上市公司销售操控行为有损于股东未来获利能力和公司未来投资水平,具有严重经济后果的结论,丰富了实际活动盈余管理经济后果的研究内容。

The economic consequences of real earnings management are ignored in current literature.From the perspective of sale manipulation,studying companies listed in A-share market in China,this paper finds that firms suspected of manipulating sale have lower subsequent shareholder profitability and corporate investment level than those that do not manipulate sale.Then,by comparing and contrasting the subsequent three-year shareholder profitability and corporate investment level,the paper concludes that sale manipulation has a significantly negative impact on future shareholder profitability and future corporate investment level,which lead to serious economic consequences.The conclusion contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of real earnings management.