股权融资大股东控制权收益的博弈分析

The Game Analysis of the Control Benefits of the Major Shareholders in Equity Financing

我国上市公司股权结构可以看成由拥有控制权的大股东和众多分散的中小股东构成。在股权融资中,大股东可以凭借其控股权剥夺中小股东利益,获得控制权收益。本文建立博弈模型分析了大股东和中小股东的行为,给出大股东获取控制权收益的条件,并就如何防止其侵害中小股东利益提出相应建议。

Ownership structure of listed companies in China can be formed by the major dominating shareholders and the young shareholders who are composed of the large number of dispersed investors.In equity financing,the major shareholders can deprive the interests of the young shareholders by virtue of its controlling power to get private benefits of control.The authors build the game model to analyze the behaviors of large shareholders and small shareholders,and give the conditions of how the major shareholders gain access to private benefits of control.At last,the authors put forward the corresponding suggestions on how to prevent the major shareholders against the interests of the young shareholders.