摘要
将具有自由意志的"图林机"看作康德式"理性存在"的一种理想模型,可以提供道德哲学讨论的替代性方法论基础。但是,这里首先会遇到一个佯谬:通过图林测试的图林机要以"说谎"来证明自己是"理性存在",从而违背了(道德的)理性法则。这就是所谓的"康德-图林佯谬"。我们的论证将表明,图林机不会说谎,从而康德-图林佯谬并不存在。
If a Turing's machine with free-will were regarded as a rational being posed by Kant, an alternative methodology of philosophy of moral would be grounded. But a logical dilemma we must confront as follows: a Turing's machine passing the Turing's test must prove it a rational being via telling lies, so that it conflicts the rational law of morals. That's so-called kant-Turing dilemma. But we argue that a Turing's machine isn't able to tell a lie. So there is not such a dilemma.
出处
《伦理学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第5期54-59,共6页
Studies in Ethics
基金
国家社科基金一般项目"价值道义论:在理由与行动之间"(09BZX057)
华东师范大学冯契基金资助
