银行信贷监审中的合谋腐败问题研究

Study on the Collusive Corruption in Supervision and Examination of Bank Credit

商业银行是一个典型的层级组织,存在多重委托代理问题,内部合谋腐败问题非常严重,本文以Laffont和Tirole所提出的P-S-A三层级代理硬信息约束模型为分析框架,分析了诚实但成本高昂的监审人员、廉价但会腐败的监审人员、廉价但会腐败和诚实但成本高昂的监审人员三种情况存在的信贷活动,研究作为代理人的银行信贷经理和信贷监审者之间可能合谋的问题,指出了可能会引致腐败的内部监审仍然是必要的,而只依赖于高成本但有效的外部审查缺乏效率,并相应地给出了一些建议。

Commercial banks are typical hierarchical organizations, in which multiple principal-agent problem exists and induces the serious internal collusive corruption. Based on paper analyzes the collusive corruption between the credit supervisor and the credit manager in bank credit activities, through three possible situations of supervision and examination, including honest but the high cost supervisor alone, cheap but corrupt supervisor alone, honest but the high cost supervisor and cheap but corrupt supervisor together. This paper points out that internal cheap but corrupt supervisor could induce collusive corruption but is still necessary, while honest but the high cost external supervisor could avoid collusive corruption but is lack of efficiency. Accordingly, some suggestions are put forward accordingly.