摘要
当中央银行信息具有私人信息(private information)的性质时,公众并不能够准确了解货币政策的目标,或者对货币政策的公告不完全相信,此时将难以如巴罗—戈登模型所描述的那样,能够形成稳定的通货膨胀预期均衡。在本质上人们就如同计量经济学家那样,每期观察主要的经济变量,不断估计和更新相应的参数,动态形成对未来的通胀预期。本文的研究重点是通过建立附加前瞻性政策变量的VAR预期模型,利用1995.1季度-2009.4季度中国的实际数据,实证研究1997.1季度-2009.4季度我国公众的通货膨胀预期,并对我国公众通货膨胀预期的特征、我国货币政策的可信度等进行较深入分析。
The public cannot know exactly the goal or do not heheve the announcements of monetary policy completely when the central bank has private information, and then the stable equilibrium of inflation expectations depicted in Barro-Gordon model will not exist, lust as econometricians, the public form inflation expectations using forecasting model that they continuously update based on incoming data. Based on the VAR model with forward-looking variables of monetary policy and the data of China from 1995.1Q to 2009.4Q, the paper examines the inflation expectations of the public from 1997. l Q to 2009.4Q, probes deeply into the characteristics of inflation expectations and the credibility of monetary policy in China.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第9期17-30,共14页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
作者主持的国家社科基金项目"金融危机后我国资产价格
通胀预期与货币政策预期管理"(10BJL019)的阶段性成果
中国博士后特别资助项目(200902171)
安徽大学杰出青年项目
创新团队项目的资助
关键词
通货膨胀
通货膨胀预期
货币政策
inflation, inflation expectations, monetary policy