谁影响了上市公司高管薪酬激励——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

Factors Influencing Top-management Incentives of Listed Companies —— Empirical Evidence from Chinese Stock Market

已有研究表明,大股东持股比例、债务水平与管理层权力会影响高管薪酬激励。本文在此基础上将高管薪酬激励的扭曲分为激励过度与激励不足,并结合我国特殊的制度背景研究了大股东、债权人和管理层对激励扭曲影响的程度。研究发现,股权越集中,激励过度程度越弱,激励不足程度越强;相对长期借款而言,短期借款会限制高管薪酬激励过度的现象,这一关系在激励不足组中并不明显;管理层权力越大,则会加大激励过度与不足的程度。在考虑了产权性质的差异后,这三个方面对激励过度与不足的影响也发生了变化。研究结果表明,高管薪酬激励过度与激励不足会受到大股东、债权人、管理层和产权性质的不同影响,这为进一步理解高管薪酬激励提供了新的经验证据。

Past studies have shown that the managerial incentives are influenced by equity ratio of large shareholders,level of debt and management power.In this paper,the distortion of managerial incentives will be divided into excessive incentive and insufficient incentive.Then,based on specific institutional background of our country,this paper investigates the influence of the major shareholders,creditors and management on the extent of incentive distortion.The results show that the more the concentrated equity ratio,the weaker the degree of excessive incentive,the stronger the degree of insufficient incentive;compared with long-term debts,the short-term debts limit the phenomenon of managerial excessive incentives,but this relationship was not evident in the group of insufficient incentives;the management power increase the level of excessive incentive and insufficient incentive.When taking into account differences in the nature of ownership,the relationship between three parties and incentives distortion will be changed.The results imply that managerial excessive incentive and insufficient incentive will be differently impacted by the majority shareholder,creditors,management and the nature of ownership,thus this results provide new empirical evidence in order to further understand the perspective of managerial incentives.