资产减值准备净计提、盈余管理与公司治理结构——来自2004-2008年中国制造业上市公司的经验证据

Assets Write-downs,Earnings Management and Corporate Governance Structure:Evidence from China

论文以2004-2008年中国A股制造业上市公司为研究对象,深入分析了新会计准则体系实施前后上市公司长期资产和流动资产减值准备净计提行为中的盈余管理动机以及各种公司治理机制对盈余管理动机的调节作用。实证检验结果表明:(1)一方面,新会计准则实施前后,公司长期资产减值准备的净计提比例表现平稳,而流动资产减值准备的净计提比例却出现了大幅波动;另一方面,新会计准则实施前后,流动资产减值准备净计提行为中都存在多种盈余管理目的。因此,论文认为上市公司在规避和迎合新会计准则体系规定的动机下具有对资产减值准备结构进行"合规"调整以实现盈余管理目的的明显偏好。(2)上市公司长期资产和流动资产减值准备行为中都存在扭亏为盈、平滑利润、避免亏损、"大清洗"等盈余管理动机,而新会计准则体系的实施仅在一定程度上有效制约了个别盈余管理行为(如"大清洗")。(3)我们并没有发现公司治理机制对上市公司资产减值准备中的各种盈余管理动机具有稳定一致的调节制约作用。论文的研究结论对于进一步规范上市公司的资产减值准备行为具有重要的启示和政策意义。

Given the significance of assets write-downs in the quality of accounting information, it is much important to thoroughly analyze assets write-downs behavior and thus help perfect information disclosure requirements and improve the value relevance of accounting information. Previous empirical studies, in large quantity, find evidence that there are severe earnings management motives in long-term assets write-downs behavior in Chinese listed com- panies. Under this background, the New Accounting Standard System since 2007 in China has prohibited the reversal behavior of long-term assets write-downs. However, little is known that are there also earnings management motives in short-term assets write-downs be havior in China. If there are, does the New Accounting Standard System intensify the earn- ings management motives in short-term assets write-downs behavior？ And in case of the fact of universal earning management motives, can various corporate governance mechanisms play an effective role in restricting these motives in assets write downs behavior？ Hence, the main goal of this study is to explore and answer these questions. Based on data of Chinese A-share manufacturing industry listed companies during 2004-- 2008, this study explores earnings management motives in long-term and short-term assets write-downs behavior and the regulatory effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the motives before and after the New Accounting Standard System. This study draws the follow- ing three main findings. First, although we have found no evidence that there are intrusive and substantial rever- sals of long-term assets write-downs, we find that there are sharp fluctuations in short-term assets write-downs behavior before and after the New Accounting Standard System. This finding suggests that listed companies have changed the assets write-downs structure in order to avoid and cater to the regulations of the New Accounting Standard System. Hence, listed companies may prefer to manage their earnings through short-term assets write-downs behav- ior. And we also find evidence for this intention. Second, we find evidence that both economic factors and earnings management motives decide the size of long-term and short-term assets write-downs. Specifically, there are earn- ings management motives such as avoiding suffering loss, smoothing profit, and taking a big bath in both long-term and short-term assets write-downs behavior. Although certain earning management motives （e. g. , taking a big bath） have been significantly reduced after the promulgation of the New Accounting Standard System, other motives （e. g. , smoothing prof- it, avoiding suffering loss） are still severe in both long-term and short-term assets write- downs behavior in Chinese listed companies. Finally, we find no evidence that no matter before or after the promulgation of the New Accounting Standard System, corporate governance mechanisms （e. g. , concentrated owner- ship, multiple large shareholders structure, management ownership, ownership property, and the duality of CEO and chief Chairman） have a consistent and effective regulating effect on the relationship between earnings management motives and long-term and short-term as- sets write-downs behavior, even encourage some kinds of earnings management motives. The findings in this study have important implications for policymakers in further standardizing Chinese listed companies＇ behavior in assets write-downs.