家族内部的权力偏离及其对治理效率的影响——对家族上市公司的研究

Power Deviation among Family Agents and Its Effect on Firm Value——An Empirical Study in China

家族成员内部权力结构的制度安排是影响家族治理效率的重要因素之一。本文以家族上市公司的所有家族成员作为研究对象,对他们所持有的投票权、现金流权和管理权的权力偏离状况及其如何影响公司的治理效率进行了理论分析与实证检验。研究的结果表明:家族成员在经营企业过程中普遍地存在权力偏离现象,即他们各自所持有的投票权、现金流权和管理权并不是完全对称的、互补的;家族成员内部的权力偏离将导致不可忽视的家族冲突与代理问题,并最终对家族上市公司的治理效率产生显著的消极影响;家族成员内部的权力偏离的消极作用还受到家族财富的影响,在家族财富增长的情况下,权力的偏离将进一步恶化家族代理问题。

Power arrangement among family agents is one of the key factors influencing the governance efficiency of family businesses. This paper takes all of the family agents having voting rights, cash flow rights and management power in the family firm as analysis unit, and studies the impact of power deviation among family agents on firm＇s governance efficiency. Our empirical findings indicate that： Family agents＇ voting rights, cash flow rights and management rights are not perfectly symmetrical; The phenomenon of power deviation among family agents often exists in the process of family involving business; Power deviation among family agents＂ will lead to serious internal agency problems, and ultimately has a significantly negative impact on the governance efficiency; Family wealth will moderate the relationship between family agents＇ power deviation and the firm value, which means that power deviation will further deteriorate the conflicts among family agents and agency cost as family wealth increases.