民营企业政治关联、雇员规模与薪酬成本

Political Connection of Private Firm, Number of Employees and Labor Cost

本文以2006—2009年在深圳、上海证券交易所上市的民营企业为样本,从扩大就业规模、保持社会稳定的政治性成本角度研究了政治关联对企业雇佣行为的影响。经验证据显示政治关联企业的雇员规模、薪酬成本均显著高于非关联企业,并且政治关联程度越高,雇员的规模及其薪酬成本也越高,这一结论表明政治关联的民营企业也受到了政府为实现扩大就业、促进社会稳定目标而进行的政治干预,为保持其政治声誉和政治地位,政治关联的民营企业比非关联企业雇佣了更多的劳动力,并支付了更高的薪酬成本。

Using data of private enterprises listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange for the period from 2006 to 2009, this paper studies whether political connection affected the corporate employment from the angle of political cost such as enlarging employment scale and maintaining social stability. Empirical evidence shows that number of employees and labor costs are significantly higher than non-connection companies. Moreover, the higher level of political connection, the more number of employees, and the greater of labor cost. So private firms which have political connection have also been intervened by government for realization of expanding employment and promoting social stability, and in order to maintain their political reputation, political connected firms employed more labors and paid them higher salaries.