特许权价值、公司治理机制和商业银行风险承担

Franchise Value,Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Commercial Banks' Risk-Taking

本文运用中国34家商业银行2006～2009年的数据，对特许权价值和公司治理机制与银行风险承担的关系进行实证研究发现，特许权价值能够显著降低风险承担；在来上市城市商业银行中，第一大股东持股比例越高风险承担越高，而前十大股东持股比例却与风险承担负相关；董事会规模与风险承担负相关，而对未上市城市商业银行风险承担未产生显著影响；尽管高管持股现象并不普遍，但高管持股能够显著增加银行风险承担；第一大股东性质、独立董事比例以及薪酬最高的前三名高管的平均薪酬并没有对风险承担产生显著影响，表明独立董事尚未充分发挥职能。

Based on the Chinese 34 commercial banks＇ data from 2006 to 2009, this paper empirically analyzes the relationship between the franchise value,corporate governance mechanisms and the bank＇s risk-taking. The authors find that the franchise value can significantly reduce the risk-taking. In unlisted city commercial banks, the higher the proportion of the largest shareholders, the higher the risk-taking, while the proportion of top ten shareholders is negatively correlated with risk-taking. The board size is negatively correlated with risk-taking, but it does not significantly affect the unlisted city commercial bank＇s risk-taking. Although the executive ownership is not a common phenomenon, it can significantly increase the bank＇s risk-taking. The nature of the largest shareholders, the proportion of independent directors and the average pay of the top three highest paid executives have no significant effect on risk-taking, which indicates that the independent directors have not yet fully perform the oversight, recommen- dations and other functions.