因果性的反事实条件分析：大卫·刘易斯及其批评者

Counterfactual Account of Causality:Review of David Lewis and Critics

刘易斯的因果性反事实条件分析是新休谟主义进路的典型代表,它试图通过引入"反事实条件"的模态范畴来弥补传统律则性理论的不足。然而,这一分析进路又产生了诸如可能世界的相似性、反事实条件依赖的时间箭头等新问题;本奈特、豪斯曼和霍维奇等人揭示了刘易斯的理论在这些问题上的根本困难。而这些困难的最终解决依赖于彻底抛弃休谟主义的因果性研究进路,转向因果实在论和实验的、操作的因果观念。

David Lewis's counterfactual analysis of causality is a very typical account in terms of Neo-Humean approach,which attempts to revise the traditional regularity theory by incorporating modal conception such as counterfactuals. However,that approach could not be the conclusive thought on analysis of causality,since it seems much implausible to make sense of the similarity between different possible worlds,as well as the temporal direction of counterfactual dependence,under Lewis's characterization. This article gives a critical review on those difficulties in Lewis's theory,and it may turn out that,a successful solution may be to abandon Humean regularity approach thoroughly,and to characterize causality in some realistic sense of manipulability.