非正式国际机制的形式选择

The Form Choice of Informal International Regimes

关于非正式国际机制的形式选择,已有的理论从问题特征、非正式机制特有优势、交易成本等视角进行了解释。由于没有考虑国内层次的激励因素,已有理论的预期与一些经验现实不相符合。作者采用国内和国际层次相结合的视角,从国内偏好、承诺可信性需求和国家间相互依赖的结构性特征等方面探讨了国家选择非正式国际机制的基本动因:如果国家决策者没有因强势社会团体的推动而产生正式国际机制的偏好,非正式机制更能满足全国性选民体的利益,并且承诺可信性需求较低,国家就会偏好于非正式国际机制。在非排他性的国家间相互依赖状态中,只要少数国家偏好于非正式国际机制,非正式国际机制就往往会成为最终的集体选择结果。通过对多边出口控制机制的形式选择的案例分析,作者对上述基本动因进行了说明。

The existing theories explained the form choice of informal international regimes from the perspectives of the issue characteristics,the specific advantages of informal regimes and transaction costs.However,because they didn’t take the domestic incentives into account,the existing theories can’t explain some empirical phenomena.Based on national and international analysis,the author argues that if the state decision-makers don’t have the preference for formal international regimes pushed by powerful social groups,informal international regime would be more attractive to domestic constituencies;with low demand for commitment credibility,the government will prefer informal international regime.In cases of non-exclusive interdependence,as long as a small number of countries show their preference,informal international regimes will always be the final collective choice.The case study of multilateral export control regimes supported the above argument.