知情权视域下的投资者保护——基于中国公司自主性治理的研究

Investor Protection in the Perspective of Right to Know——Study based on Voluntarily Governance of Chinese Companies

伴随着中国公司治理模式的转型,中国公司的投资者保护也不断得到改善。尽管公司的股东应该拥有平等的知情权,但控股股东利用其知情权优势对中小股东的权益进行侵害。在自主性治理中,公司与投资者之间是互动沟通的过程,公司向投资者传递信息,同时也从投资者收集反馈信息,在投资者(尤其是中小股东)和公司之间形成良好的互动,使其对公司的相关信息具有完全的知情权。在完全知情权的基础上,投资者(尤其是中小股东)作出理性决策,并尽可能地避免控股股东的"掏空"行为,使其权益得到有效保护。

With the evolution of the pattern of Chinese Corporate Governance,the investor protection of the Chinese companies has been being improved.Even though the shareholders of the company should have the equal right to know,the controlling shareholders encroach on the right and interest of the small and median ones with the predominance of the right to know.The communication process between the company with the voluntarily governance and the investors is interactive.When the company sends the information to the investors,it collects the relative information from them.If the interactive communication between the company and the investors（especially the small and median shareholders） forms,the investors will have the complete right to know.Based on the complete right to know,the investors（especially the small and median shareholders） make the reasonable decision and the Tunneling of the controlling shareholders will be avoided as much as possible,as a result,the right and interest of the small and median shareholders will be protected as much as possible.