多个终极大股东、产权组合与公司绩效

Multiple Ultimate Large Shareholders,Property Rights Combination and Corporate Performance

本文基于2007年1351家A股公司的手工收集数据,探讨多个终极大股东的控制权竞争、产权组合、进入公司管理层如何影响公司绩效。经验证据发现,从公司绩效角度,多个终极大股东间的控制权竞争可能表现为监督和激励效应,也可能表现为合谋和侵害效应,或者两类效应共存而相互抵消;当第一、第二位终极大股东的产权形式互不相同时,不会提升或者减损公司绩效,而当第一、第二位终极大股东都为国有产权或私有产权时,对公司绩效没有显著的正面或负面影响;第一位终极大股东担任公司董事长或CEO,对公司绩效具有显著的正面效应,而第二或第三位终极大股东进入公司管理层会提升或减损公司绩效,具有监督或合谋效应。我们还发现,前三位终极大股东的两权分离都具有侵害效应。

Using manually collected data on 1351 A-share companies in 2007, this paper examines how the contestability, involvement in the management and property rights combination of multiple ultimate large shareholders influence corporate performance. Based on the empirical evidences, the contestability of multiple ultimate large shareholders may have monitoring and incentive or collusion and entrenchment effects on corporate performance, or the two kinds of effects coexist and counteract. When the property rights forms of the first and second ultimate large shareholder are different, the corporate performance is not improved even impaired. But in case of that both of the first and second ultimate large shareholder belong to the state or private property rights, it has no significant positive or negative impacts on corporate performance. The first ultimate large shareholder in CEO or board chairman posi- tion has markedly positive effects on corporate performance, but the second or third ultimate large shareholder＇s involvement in the management promotes or does harm to corporate performance, which behaves monitoring or collusion effects. Additionally, the ownership-control discrepancy of the first three ultimate large shareholders each exhibits harmful effects.