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欧盟制度对政策制定谈判的影响 被引量:2

The Impact of EU Institutions on Policy-Making Negotiation
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摘要 欧盟重要政策的制定,大都是政府间谈判的产物。欧盟日趋成熟的制度设计,对于政府间谈判的成功发挥了重要的作用。欧盟重要的政策制定谈判主要在部长理事会内进行,并受到这一机构自身机制的影响;欧盟委员会、欧洲议会、理事会轮值主席和秘书处也通过相应机制,对部长理事会的谈判施加影响。欧盟制度自身也存在局限。改革欧盟制度,更好地推动政府间谈判进程,欧盟必须克服自身存在的矛盾,在超国家、政府间和民主三个维度间实现平衡。 Most of important EU policy-makings are the product of intergovernmental negotiations.The growing-up institution design of EU plays an important role in the success of intergovernmental negotiation.Important policy-making negotiations mainly hold in the Council of Ministers and are impacted by the regimes of the Council.European Commission,European parliament, Presidency and General Secretariat of the Council also impact on the negotiations of Council of Ministers by means of relevant regimes.However,some defects still exist in the EU institutions.For the purpose of reforming the EU institutions and promoting the process of intergovernmental negotiations,EU must overcome the inherent contradictions and achieve a balance among the supranational,intergovernmental and democratic dimensions.
出处 《南开学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第5期29-38,共10页 Nankai Journal:Philosophy,Literature and Social Science Edition
基金 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(NKZXA10027)
关键词 欧洲区域治理 欧盟制度 政府间谈判 部长理事会 《里斯本条约》 European Regional Governance EU Institution Intergovernmental Negotiation Council of Ministers Lisbon Treaty
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参考文献37

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同被引文献12

  • 1Mark A.Pollack. Delegation,Agency,and Agenda Setting in the European Community[J].International Organization,1997,(01):99-134.
  • 2Mark A.Pollack. Delegation,Agency,and Agenda Setting in the European Community[M].
  • 3Eugenia da Conceicao. Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics[J].Journal of Common Market Studies,2010,(04):1107-1126,here1110.
  • 4Eugenia da Conceicao. Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics[M].
  • 5Eugenia da Conceicao-Heldt. The Common Fisheries Policy in the European Union:A Study in Integrative and Distributive Bargaining[M].New York,London:Routledge,2004.45.
  • 6Eugenia da Conceicao. Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses in EU Trade Politics[M].
  • 7Kalypso Nicolaidis. Minimizing Agency Costs in Two-Level Games:Lessons from the Trade Authority Controversies in the United States and the European Union[A].London:Sage Publication,2000.111.
  • 8Bart Kerremans. Principal(s) versus Agent An Analysis of the Impact of Member States' Control on the Commission's Behaviors as Trade Policy Entrepreneur in WTO Negotiations[M].Leuven:Political Science Department of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven,2004.7.
  • 9Darren G.Hawkins,David A.Lake,Daniel L.Nielson,Michael J.Tiemey. Delegation Under Anarchy:States,International Organizations,and Principal-Agent Theory[A].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2006.28.
  • 10薇薇.安.施密特,杨娜.欧盟及其成员国:从自下而上到自上而下[J].南开学报(哲学社会科学版),2010(5):1-8. 被引量:3

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