摘要
Ryle holds that knowing how and knowing that are different in kind.Stanley and Williamson call Ryle’s infinite regress argument against intellectualism into question,and claim that Ryle is wrong in taking know how as equivalent to ability,moreover,they argue that knowing how is a species of knowing that by appealing to some contemporary syntactic and semantic theories.This essay responds to these three challenges one by one on behalf of Ryle,and claims that Stanley and Williamson do not have an adequate understanding of Ryle’s conception of knowing how.One can’t dispense with the following three elements,namely,action,intelligence and ability to have a complete understanding of knowing how in Ryle’s sense.Unfortunately,in each of these aspects,Stanley and Williamson go astray.
Ryle holds that knowing how and knowing that are different in kind.Stanley and Williamson call Ryle's infinite regress argument against intellectualism into question,and claim that Ryle is wrong in taking know how as equivalent to ability,moreover,they argue that knowing how is a species of knowing that by appealing to some contemporary syntactic and semantic theories.This essay responds to these three challenges one by one on behalf of Ryle,and claims that Stanley and Williamson do not have an adequate understanding of Ryle's conception of knowing how.One can't dispense with the following three elements,namely,action,intelligence and ability to have a complete understanding of knowing how in Ryle's sense.Unfortunately,in each of these aspects,Stanley and Williamson go astray.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第10期70-78,共9页
Philosophical Research
基金
国家社科基金项目(编号10BZX048)
上海市重点学科项目(编号B401)的阶段性成果
