摘要
公众参与是我国环境治理中的热门话题,尤其是近年来环保事故频出和极端天气频现后,社会各界对公众参与寄予厚望,因此对公众参与环境治理效果的研究具有适时性和重要性。本文基于新制度经济学中有关监督和激励理论,对公众参与环境治理构建了P-S-A(委托人政府;监察者公众;代理人企业)三层委托代理分析模型,对我国环境治理中没有公众参与、公众事后参与、公众事前参与和赋予公众环境损害赔偿权等不同参与模式的治理效果进行了对比分析。研究结果表明:灵活的激励制度和治理技术水平的提升是提高环境治理效能的必要条件;公众事后对企业实施低技术类型的监督,如举报企业偷排漏排行为等,反而会产生对政府监督的挤出效应,最终社会整体的环境治理效果不一定最佳;公众事前参与对企业或项目环境决策实施高技术类型的监督,如公众参与环评等举措,则会更有效地提高社会整体环境治理效果;而赋予公众环境损害索赔权,则是改变目前我国环境"软治理"约束的根本性举措。
In China, public participation has become a popular subject in environmental governance area. Stakeholders put more hope on public participation particularly in recent years when environmental accidents and extreme weather events took place more frequently. Consequently, it is a timely and important issue to study the effectiveness of public participation in environmental governance. Based on the supervision and incentive theories of New Institutional Economies, a P-S-A three-tier model was built in this paper where P represented principal (the Government), S represented supervisor (the Public), and A represented agency (the Enterprises). The paper examined and compared the govemance results in various scenarios: no public participation, Iow-type-tech supervising, high-type-teeh supervising,, and public participation with the rights to claim damage. The following conclusions were drawn in the end: flexible incentive arrangement and governance skills are necessary conditions; Iow-type-tech supervising such as reporting corporate allegations of illegal en^ission would have crowding-out effects on government supervision which may lead to a not-so-good result for the society as a whole; high-type-tech supervising on companies or projects, such as public participation in environmental impact assessment, can effectively improve environmental governance performance; finally, giving general public the rights to claim environmental damage is a fundamental way to change the current situation of "soft constrain".
出处
《中国人口·资源与环境》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第10期48-54,共7页
China Population,Resources and Environment