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审计独立性水平确定的博弈分析

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摘要 本文以审计客户实施舞弊,并且注册会计师发现了其舞弊行为后注册会计师的行为选择为起点,从不同利益主体对审计独立性水平影响来探讨审计独立性水平的确定。研究发现注册会计师的独立性水平是审计客户、外部投资者、市场力量、监管力量和法律力量相互较量的结果,其水平的高低取决于几方力量的对比变化。
作者 李俊梅
机构地区 新疆石河子大学
出处 《财政监督》 北大核心 2010年第20期52-53,共2页
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