摘要
利用信息经济学委托-代理理论,结合城市供水行业自然垄断性的特点,设计了一种激励相容的城市生活用水水价机制,将价格定在边际成本上,并对成本进行补贴。该机制不仅可以使供水企业如实申报经营成本,还有降低成本的激励作用。
By means of the principal-agent theory of information economics,according to the characteristics of natural monopoly of urban water supply industry,an incentive-compatible water price mechanism of urban domestic water based on marginal supply cost and exogenous subsidy was designed.This mechanism may lead to actual report of operating cost by water supply companies and has the incentive function in cost reduction.
出处
《水利水电科技进展》
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第5期33-36,共4页
Advances in Science and Technology of Water Resources
关键词
城市生活用水
水价
非对称信息
激励相容机制
urban domestic water
water price
asymmetric information
compatible incentive mechanism
