中国商业银行治理机制有效性的实证分析

Empirical Analysis on Validity of Chinese Commercial Bank Governance

本文利用全国52家商业银行2007年和2008年的年报作为数据来源,对我国商业银行的公司治理机制及其有效性进行了实证分析。研究发现,集中型股权结构显著地降低了银行绩效ROA、ROE,增加了银行的风险,但对EVA没有显著影响。职工监事数量的增加明显提高银行绩效,降低风险,提高了银行效率。大股东的国有性质对ROA和ROE产生了正向影响,但董事会规模有负向影响,独立董事制度对银行绩效没有显著影响,但显著地降低了银行的风险。

This paper analyzes the validity of the bank governance mechanism based on the data of 52 Chinese banks’ 2007 and 2008 annual reports.We find that centralized stock ownership decreases R.O.A.and R.O.E.（bank performance measures） significantly,and it increases the bank risk,while it has no obvious effects on the E.V.A.The increasing number of the employee supervisors improves the bank performance and efficiency remarkably and reduces the bank risk simultaneously.The state-owned nature affects R.O.A.and R.O.E.positively;however,the board scale has a negative effect.The system of independent directors has no significant effects on the bank performance but it reduces the bank risk.