中央政府供给地区生态补偿的内生缺陷——对补偿原则和收益原则内在矛盾的分析

The Endogenous Defects in Central Government Supplying Local Ecological Compensation——An Analysis on the Contradiction between Compensation Principle and Reward Principle

我国现在实施的生态补偿以财政补偿为主,其中,中央对地方的财政补偿所占的比例最高。鉴于这种情况,作者从地方公共品供给的角度,考察了由于补偿原则和收益原则的内在矛盾——在功利主义回报原则下,中央政府的转移支付难以达到完全补偿;在自然回报原则下,中央政府的转移支付显著的使分配非中性,违背自然回报原则所要求的中立性——不能同时达到补偿的完全性与中性。由于这种内生缺陷的存在,中央政府供给地区生态补偿时难以使所有地区都满意,其本身也陷入难以进退的矛盾境地。本文认为在我国纵向转移支付占据主导地位的今天,政府若要有效供给诸如环境保护类型的溢出性地方公共品,就应该转变单线条的由上至下的转移支付模式,强化地方供给,加强地区之间的横向交流,如让地区之间直接谈判如何划分合作的收益或如何进行横向的补偿,以使地方政府承担更多的地区生态补偿责任。

Considering China＇s ecological compensation is mainly composed of financial compensation, in which the transfer payments from central government to local is in the majority, this article explores two kinds of endogenous defects when central government supplies local ecological compensation from the perspective of local public goods： under the principle of utilitarian reward, transfer payments from central government cannot fully compensate for undue inequalities; under the principle of natural reward, it may automatically alter the distribution in a non-neutral way, which means it is difficult to obtain full and neutral transfers at the same time. Due to thus endogenous defects, not only it is impossible for the central government to satisfy all her regions, but also it reflects the dilemma the central government faced. In the light of this, the single vertical financial compensation should be changed if the government wants to supply the overflowing local public goods such as environmental protection. The conclusion is that horizontal cooperation among local governments should be strengthened, such as negotiate how to divide the benefit from cooperation or compensate horizontally, to make local governments assume more responsibility for ecological compensation.