供应链融资的供应商与制造商委托代理激励机制研究

Principal-agent Incentive Mechanism of the Supplier and Manufacturer in Supply Chain Financing

供应链融资的中小型供应商和核心型制造商之间,物料供应合约归结为委托代理激励合约。在信息对称情况下,核心制造企业通过设计线性激励,使供应商达到帕累托最优努力水平,并且能够实现制造商收益和供应商成本损失之间的帕累托最优均衡。在信息非对称情况下,制造商通过设计线性激励,以付出最小代理成本为代价,使供应商选择最优努力水平的同时承担一定份额的风险,能够实现制造商和供应商期望收益效用最大化。

In supply chain financing,the materials supply contract between small and medium-sized suppliers and the core manufacturer comes down to a principal-agent incentive contract.Under symmetric information,by working out a linear incentive scheme,the manufacturer enables the suppliers to reach the Pareto Optimal,and realizes the benefit-cost Pareto Optimal between the principal and the agent.Under asymmetric information,by devising a linear incentive scheme,the manufacturer,at the minimum agency cost,makes the suppliers optimize their effort levels and take their share of risks,hence the expected benefit utility optimal for both the manufacturer and the suppliers can be realized.