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中国上市公司期权激励的影响因素分析 被引量:4

Study on the Impact Factors of Stock Option Motivation for China's Listed Companies
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摘要 以2006至2009年A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了我国上市公司选择期权激励的主要影响因素。结果表明,当公司成长机会多、机构投资者持股比例高时,上市公司选择期权激励的概率就越高;当公司规模大、风险高、股权集中、现金流充沛及监管严格时,上市公司选择期权激励的概率就越低。 Selecting A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2009 as samples,this paper empirically examines the primary determinations of China's listed companies to choose stock option motivation.The results show that firms with more growth opportunities and higher institutional investors holding have more probabilities to choose stock option motivation;firms with bigger size,higher risk,higher equity concentration,abundant cash flow and rigorous regulation have lower probability to choose stock option motivation.
作者 郑鸣 徐璐
出处 《软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第10期87-92,共6页 Soft Science
关键词 期权激励 影响因素 LOGIT回归 stock option motvation impact factors Logit regression
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参考文献5

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同被引文献33

  • 1顾斌,周立烨.我国上市公司股权激励实施效果的研究[J].会计研究,2007(2):79-84. 被引量:351
  • 2夏立军,陈信元.市场化进程、国企改革策略与公司治理结构的内生决定[J].经济研究,2007,42(7):82-95. 被引量:346
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  • 7Hidcaki Kiyoshi Kato, Michael Lemmon, Mi Luo, James Schallheim. An Empirical Examination of the Costs and Benefits of Executive Stock Options : Evidence from Japan [J]. Journal of Financial Economics. 2005, (78) : 435 - 461.
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