期刊文献+

供应链中产品与信息质量改进的战略联盟策略研究 被引量:30

Research on strategic alliances strategy of quality and information improvement in supply chains
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摘要 本文分析了一个包含单个供应商和单个制造商的供应链,研究了关于供应商的产品质量和市场需求的信息质量改进的战略联盟策略的设计,分析了成本共担策略能提高供应链绩效的条件及其对供应链的影响和价值.在供应链联盟中制造商参与到供应商的质量改进活动中,使供应商具有改进质量水平的激励,相应的使市场需求均值增加或使需求信息精度提高,供应商的期望收益比分散决策的供应链中的收益增加,当质量成本共担参数满足某些条件时,制造商也将获得比无战略联盟情况中更高的收益. We consider a supply chain with one supplier and one manufacturer.We investigate the design of strategic alliance for improvement of supplier' product quality and information quality of market demand.We analyze a cost sharing mechanism,and conditions under which supply chain's performance would be improved and also the effects and values to the supply chain.After the manufacturer participates in the activity of quality improvement with the supplier in the strategic alliance,the supplier has more incentive to improve the qualities,and correspondingly the mean of market demand becomes higher or the accuracy of demand information be improved.The supplier would gain more profits than those in decentralized supply chain cases.When the parameters of cost sharing satisfying some conditions,the manufacturer will also gains more profits in the strategic alliance.
出处 《管理科学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第10期79-88,共10页 Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(7100208470832005) 上海市重点学科建设资助项目(B210)
关键词 供应链 质量管理 战略联盟 协调 一体化 supply chain quality management strategic alliances coordination integration
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参考文献13

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二级参考文献25

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